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Abstract 
In this thesis I investigate the potential trade effects associated with three antidumping 
cases filed by the U.S. steel industry during the first decade of the 21st century. The 
analysis consists of a detailed case study, covering everything from the establishment 
of dumping margins to the final effects. The empirical results are consistent with 
expected effects, i.e. decreasing imports from targeted subject countries, increasing 
imports from non-subject countries and increasing prices in the domestic country. 
Since the results point towards trade diversion, I discuss what the benefits of filing AD 
measures are from a petitioner’s perspective. The conclusion is that the mere 
imposition of AD measures has significant intimidating effects on foreign firms. This 
situation is indirectly stimulated by the non-transparent practices used by the 
authorities to establish the presence of dumping.     
Keywords: Dumping, Antidumping, Subject country, Steel, Trade destruction, Trade 
diversion, U.S.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction   ..................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Background   .................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Purpose   ......................................................................................................................... 7
2. Theory and Practice – How Dumping and Antidumping Works   ................................. 9
2.1 Dumping   ..................................................................................................................... 9
2.1.1 Price Discrimination, Below Cost Production and Predatory Pricing   ............... 9
2.2 The U.S. Antidumping Process   .................................................................................. 11
2.2.1 Dumping and Injury Investigations   .................................................................... 11
3. Effects of Antidumping   .................................................................................................. 14
3.1 Quantity Effects   ...................................................................................................... 14
3.2 Price Effects   ............................................................................................................ 15
3.3 Additional Effects   .................................................................................................. 15
4. Antidumping in the Steel Industry   ................................................................................ 17
4.1 Industry Characteristics   ............................................................................................ 17
4.2 Protection in the Past   ............................................................................................... 17
5. U.S. Antidumping - Case Studies   ...................................................................................20
5.1 Case 1: USITC 943-947 - Circular-welded Non-alloy Steel Pipe (2001)   ...................20
5.1.1 Initiation and Investigations   ...............................................................................20
5.1.2 Final Measure   ...................................................................................................... 21
5.2 Case 2: USITC 1116 – Circular-welded Non-alloy Steel Pipe (2007)   ........................ 22
5.2.1 Initiation and Investigations   ............................................................................... 22
5.2.2 Final Measure   ...................................................................................................... 23
5.3 Case 3: USITC 1024-1028 – Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand (2003)   ........... 23
5.3.1 Initiation and Investigations   ............................................................................... 23
5.3.2 Final Measure   ......................................................................................................24
6. Trade Effects of Antidumping Cases   ............................................................................. 25
6.1 Case 1 and 2: USITC 943-947 and 1116 - Circular-welded Non-alloy Steel Pipe   ..... 26
6.1.1 Quantity Effects   .................................................................................................. 26
6.1.2 Price Effects   ........................................................................................................ 29
6.1.3 Effects Sum-up   .................................................................................................... 31
4 
 
6.2 Case 3: USITC 1024-1028 – Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand   ...................... 32
6.2.1 Quantity Effects   ................................................................................................... 32
6.2.2 Price Effects  ......................................................................................................... 34
6.2.3 Effects Sum-up   .................................................................................................... 35
7. Summary and Concluding Remarks   .............................................................................. 37
References   ........................................................................................................................... 39
Appendix   .............................................................................................................................42
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Abbreviations  
AD Antidumping 
ADA Antidumping Agreement, formally known as: Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (1994) 
CVD Countervailing Duty 
DOC United States - Department of Commerce 
FA Facts Available   
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GNP Gross National Product 
HTS Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
ITC United States - International Trade Commission 
NME Non-Market Economy  
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
TPM Trigger Price Mechanism 
VER Voluntary Export Restraint 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
1. Introduction 
This section provides an introduction to the subject of antidumping and its recent 
development as a trade restricting instrument. In addition, the topic and purpose are 
discussed here.  
1.1 Background 
Antidumping (AD) is an instrument that was first used by Canada in the early 
twentieth century. It is essentially a measure filed by an injured firm, with the purpose 
of restricting “unfair” import competition caused by dumping. According to the 
Antidumping Agreement (ADA) implemented by the WTO during the Uruguay round, 
members are only allowed to impose duties if they can prove: “a) that dumping, 
[according to the definition presented in ADA article 2.1,] is occurring, b) that the 
domestic industry producing the like product in the importing country is suffering 
material injury, and c) that there is causal link between the two” (http://www.wto.org). 
These three requirements define what is considered unfair imports. They also make up 
the basic principles of the ADA. 
Since the seventies AD has been the most common type of trade dispute within the 
GATT/WTO. In fact, AD has, according to Prusa (2006 p.743), been the subject of 
more disputes than all other trade statues put together. Early on, the usage was almost 
exclusively confined to the traditional users; Australia, Canada, the EU and USA. 
Today, all countries except the poorest ones in Africa and Asia are active users (Prusa 
2006 p.748). There are numerous explanations for this spread in AD-usage. One is that 
the increase in the number of GATT/WTO members has lowered the overall tariff and 
quota levels and consequently forced member countries to look for alternative means 
of legal protection. This development, coupled with the rather vague AD regulation 
stipulated in the ADA, has stimulated the spread significantly (Prusa 2005 p.686-687). 
Moreover, the public perception encouraged by AD supporters that AD is a tool that 
restricts “unfair” trade, has added a normative dimension to the AD development. 
Thus, the use of AD is today easier to justify than other forms of protection. Another 
explanation for the spread of AD-usage is that these measures are hard to directly 
retaliate against (Prusa 2005 p.697). If, for example, the WTO finds a measure to be 
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inconsistent with the regulation, the imposing country can tweak its calculations and 
impose new duties. Further, AD measures usually target one or a number of products 
specified by the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS). The HTS system specifies products 
down to a very specific ten-digit class. This allows firms to file AD measures in a 
precise way, leaving out products that are not associated with dumping. AD measures 
are also typically targeted at multiple subject countries rather than just one, although 
the duties may vary as a consequence of the different dumping margins.   
The U.S. steel industry makes an interesting object of study because it has in the past 
received considerable protection from the government. The industry also possesses 
characteristics such as high concentration (few domestic firms), high fixed costs and 
imperfect supply. This has made it more sensitive to changes in prices and therefore a 
major user of AD measures.  
1.2 Purpose  
Like in the case of ad valorem tariffs, the goal of the AD instrument is to restrict 
imports of a certain product from targeted (subject) countries (trade destruction), 
increase the domestic price and potentially redirect imports towards non-subject 
imports (trade diversion). Consequently, the expected trade effects are the same as in 
the case of tariffs. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to study the presence of these 
AD associated trade effects. This is done by analyzing three AD cases filed by the U.S. 
steel industry in 2001, 2003 and 2007. The case-associated quantity effects on U.S. 
imports from subject and non-subject countries, as well as the price effects are then 
studied in depth with the following questions in mind:  - Is there evidence of quantity effects such as trade destruction and trade 
diversion, as well as price effects present in the samples? - In what way do the different decisions throughout the periods of investigation 
affect trade and prices? - What are the implications on domestic and foreign producers?  
In an effort to assess these questions, I have chosen to study the AD cases and the 
effects at a disaggregated level. Previous studies have shown clear aggregated effects 
associated with AD measures. The selection of the case method is intended to provide 
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a complete picture of the AD instrument, from the establishment of dumping margins 
to the final effects using the latest data.  
In this thesis chapter 2 explains the theory and practice of dumping and antidumping. 
Chapter 3 describes the expected quantity and price effects as well as a number of 
additional effects. The characteristics of the U.S. steel industry and its history of 
protectionism are described in chapter 4. In chapter 5, the three cases are presented. 
The subsequent chapter, chapter 6, provides an empirical analysis of the effects 
associated with the three selected cases. Finally, the thesis is summarized and reflected 
upon in the concluding chapter.      
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2. Theory and Practice – How Dumping and Antidumping Works 
2.1 Dumping 
The WTO defines dumping as a practice in which a firm, exports a product at less than 
its “normal value”, i.e. at a lower price on the export market than on the home market 
(WTO article 2.1 ADA). Selling goods produced below the cost of production is also 
considered dumping. The definition of dumping contains characteristics of price 
discrimination, below-cost production and predatory pricing. However, this is not a 
definition without flaws as I will explain in the section below.  
2.1.1 Price Discrimination, Below Cost Production and Predatory Pricing 
Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices in different markets. 
On the global economic arena firms use price discrimination as a means to maximize 
profits. By charging a low price in the low-cost production country and a high price in 
the foreign high-cost countries, firms maximize their profit. For this to be a successful 
strategy firms have to be operating in imperfectly competitive and well-segmented 
markets with different demand elasticities (Hoekman, Kostecki 2001 p.319). The 
segmentation of markets is a necessary condition because it eliminates arbitrage 
profits, by making it impossible to re-import goods from markets with lower prices. 
Likewise, different demand elasticities are necessary to give grounds for differences in 
prices. These, for price discrimination, necessary conditions imply the existence of 
some sort of trade barriers such as transport costs, regulations, tariffs, etc. Price 
discrimination is not a bad practice nor is it, according to nearly all domestic 
competition authorities, a prohibited one (Kerr 2006 p.16). It is simply another way for 
firms to profit maximize, given the above stated conditions. 
Like price discrimination, below cost production can very well be justified on 
economic grounds. After all, it is not prohibited for firms to lose money. In the event of 
an economic downturn or some other event that will incur losses on firms, the 
continuation of production can be profit maximizing (loss minimizing). As long as the 
price of the produced good is higher than the average variable costs, the firm will 
continue to produce. This makes sense as the continuation of the production will cover 
some of the fixed costs. In economic theory, fixed costs are often viewed as sunk 
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(irreversible) costs. This is reasonable because machines and other fixed costs are used 
to perform a specific task. Once the decision is made to stop the production, the 
machines rarely correspond to any profit-making. In fact they rather represent a sunk 
cost in the form of absent revenues. Sunk costs therefore work as an exit barrier, which 
in the short run give firms the incentive to keep producing until the price falls below 
the average variable costs (Mankiw 2008 p.295-296). At that point, known as the 
shutdown criterion, the firm will lose money for every unit it produces and thus the 
firm will be better off closing down the production altogether (Varian 2006 p.389). 
Consequently, the practice of below-cost production can be perfectly reasonable in the 
short run.  
Predatory pricing is a type of dumping or practice where a firm is charging significantly 
lower prices on the export market than on the home market (price discrimination). To 
be able to charge this low price the firm often produces below the cost of production 
during a short period of time. The strategy is therefore a combination of price 
discrimination and below-cost production (Kerr 2006 p.18). Once the competitors have 
been defeated, the firm can generate higher profits. Thus, predatory pricing is used by 
firms for the purpose of taking over foreign markets and subsequently establish a 
global monopoly (Kerr 2006 p.16). Herein lies the difference between predatory pricing 
and other forms of dumping. This is also why predatory pricing was the original target 
of the first AD-laws. The practice was, and still is, viewed as unfair and detrimental to 
an economy. Because of this, predatory pricing is prohibited in most national 
competition laws (Kerr 2006 p.18).  
The definition of dumping in article 2.1 of the ADA, which constitutes the guideline for 
all members’ domestic AD-regulations, states that the existence of either price 
discrimination or below-cost production is significant grounds for the determination 
of dumping (Kerr 2006 p.18). What is legal in the domestic context can therefore be 
illegal in the international context. The implication of this is that firms can make 
sound economic profits and still be subjected to affirmative AD investigations from 
other countries. According to economic theory the only form of dumping that is 
harmful to an economy and, as a consequence, shall be stopped is predatory dumping. 
The wider definition of dumping employed by most countries therefore contrasts 
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economic theory. This problem has been one of the major points of discussion and 
critique concerning AD among economists worldwide, especially since it has been 
difficult to determine whether or not global predatory dumping exist in reality. 
2.2 The U.S. Antidumping Process 
The U.S. AD process is handled by two authorities. The Department of Commerce 
(DOC) handles the dumping investigation, while the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) handles the injury investigation. These investigations are run in a parallel 
fashion. Petitions are submitted to the DOC and the ITC simultaneously and they are 
only valid if “the domestic producers or workers who support the petition account for: 
(1) At least 25 percent of the total production of the domestic like product; and (2) […] 
more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like product produced by that 
portion of the industry expressing support for or opposition to the petition” (§1673a. 
(c) (4) (a), subtitle IV, the Tariff Act 1930). A petition usually leads to an initiation of a 
case and then later to preliminary and final decisions. Both the ITC and the DOC have 
to reach affirmative decisions in order for the case to reach the next level. If all 
decisions are affirmative, then AD duties can be imposed at the final stage of the 
investigations. Finally it is important to mention that the U.S. process follows the 
regulation outlined by the WTO in the ADA. 
2.2.1 Dumping and Injury Investigations 
To establish the presence of dumping the DOC has to find the “normal value” of the 
regarded product. Normal value here corresponds to a fair value of the like product on 
a market free of dumping and other disturbances. However, finding the true normal 
value can be a very strenuous exercise as factors like transport costs, differences in 
market structures and economic policy cloud the “true” normal value.  
The most straight forward way of determining the existence of dumping is to simply 
compare the net price on the U.S. market, excluding transport costs etc., to the net 
price on the home market of the exporting country (Lindsey 2000 p.5). For this method 
to be accurate the sales on the domestic market in the exporting country have to be at 
least five percent of its total sales on the U.S. market, otherwise the market is 
considered illegitimate (§ 1677b. (b) (II), subtitle IV, the Tariff Act 1930). If this is the 
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case the DOC lets price data from a suitable third party country work as a template for 
the absent price data of the exporting country (Lindsey 2000 p.5). In the event of below 
cost production or missing third country price data, the DOC is allowed to construct a 
normal value on the basis of estimated total costs of production plus reasonable 
profits. The constructed value is then compared to the export price on the U.S. market.  
Another special case, which is relevant for China and the former Soviet republics, is the 
nonmarket economy (NME) methodology. The rationale behind this is that firms 
operating in NMEs are, at least to some extent, influenced by their respective 
governments. Thus, prices under these circumstances are believed not to be 
determined by supply and demand, but rather by political factors (Ikenson 2005 p.3). 
The effect of the NME methodology is that the DOC can skip the other methods of 
calculating prices and jump straight to method of third party surrogate country 
comparisons. This means that input costs (wages, capital rents, etc), costs of 
production (electricity bills, cost of material, etc), economies of scale, size of 
purchases, mix of purchases and a number of other costs have to be translated and 
estimated from a surrogate country (Ikenson 2005 p.4-5). The practice of using a 
surrogate as a proxy when determining the existence of dumping is very important 
because it tends to increase the dumping margins, reducing NME-firms’ abilities to 
“win” (Ikenson 2005 p.5).  
Yet another important methodology is the facts available (FA) method, which is used 
whenever targeted firms in subject countries supply incorrect information about their 
domestic prices and costs. If this is the case the DOC can, according to Article VI of the 
ADA, obtain the information from a secondary source, usually the petition supplied by 
the U.S. firms (Moore 2006 p.640).  
Once the DOC reaches an affirmative decision, i.e. concludes that dumping is 
occurring the next step is to calculate the dumping margin. This margin is in the 
simplest of cases equal to the difference between the price in the exporting country 
and the U.S. price divided by the U.S. price. If for example the price in China is 10 and 
the Chinese firms charge 8 on the U.S. market, the dumping margin is: (10-8)/8 = 25 % 
(Ikenson, Lindsey 2002 p.3). According to the Tariff Act of 1930, the investigation is to 
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be put to an end if the margin is found to be de minimis, which in this case is less than 
two percent (§1673b. (b) (3), subtitle IV, the Tariff Act 1930). Once the DOC has 
reached an affirmative decision the ITC has 45 days to reach a final injury decision. The 
ITC has to prove that the U.S. industry in question is suffering material injury or threat 
of material injury and that this injury is a causal effect of the documented dumping. 
This is usually done by analyzing how increases in subject import shares affect the 
domestic production, employment, prices, etc. (Tharakan 1999 p.181-182).   
Once the DOC and the ITC have finished their investigations they can impose AD 
duties. These duties are usually set in accordance to the calculated dumping margins. 
In many cases, however, the exporting country agrees to either raise its price (price 
undertaking) or restrict its exports (voluntary export restraint) and the duty is 
therefore avoided. According to the so called sunset requirement of Article 11.3 (ADA), 
AD duties or price undertakings are to expire no later than five years after the 
imposition. That is, if the authorities cannot prove that dumping continues to exist.  
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3. Effects of Antidumping 
Effects of AD measures can be divided in two; quantity and price effects. These effects 
can be recognized from standard ad-valorem tariff analysis. This is not surprising as 
AD measures share many characteristics with ad-valorem tariffs. I also discuss the 
presence of a number of additional effects. 
3.1 Quantity Effects 
Standard tariff analysis tells us that the imposed AD duty will decrease imports from 
the subject country to the AD-imposing country. Trade destruction, as this direct 
effect is called, is essentially a result of the price wedge that is created between the 
firms in the AD-imposing country and the firms in the subject country. Thus, 
producers in the AD-imposing country will gain at the expense of the consumers 
(Senior Nello 2009 p.86-89). Other, more indirect, effects of AD measures are trade 
diversion and trade deflection. Trade diversion refers to the shift from subject to non-
subject country imports. This effect is welfare decreasing since the non-subject country 
is a less efficient producer than the hindered subject country (Senior Nello 2009 p.112-
113). If this was not true, then the non-subject country would be the primary source of 
imports from the beginning. A result of trade diversion is that consumer prices 
increase in the AD-imposing country. After all, this is the sole purpose of the AD 
instrument. Trade diversion and trade destruction associated with U.S. AD measures, 
was found in a study by Prusa in 1996. Trade deflection denotes the other side of the 
measure, namely the subject country and its shift in exports from the AD-imposing 
country to the non-subject countries (Durling, Prusa 2006 p. 679-680). Since trade 
deflection is an effect observed in third party countries, this effect will be left out of the 
upcoming analysis.    
In an example where USA is the AD-imposing country, China is the subject country 
and Mexico is a third non-subject country, the effects can be summarized in the 
following way: 
1. Trade destruction – Decreasing U.S. imports from China.  
2. Trade diversion – The decrease in Chinese imports is replaced by imports from 
Mexico.  
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3. Trade deflection – Increasing Chinese exports to Mexico (or other third party 
countries) as China is trying to find new markets.  
3.2 Price Effects 
AD measures, like ad-valorem tariffs, are expected to increase the price in the AD-
imposing country. This effect was documented by Prusa (1996) for the period 1980 - 
1988, using HTS-classified product groups. Prusa also found that prices (unit values) 
increased as AD duties increased, further strengthening the evidence of the price 
effect. The study additionally concluded that AD measures can raise prices in the non-
subject countries as well (Prusa 1996 p.13-14). A possible explanation for this is that 
firms in the non-subject country respond to the imposed AD in a strategic way.  
If dumping firms accept price undertakings, i.e. agree to raise prices and thereby 
escape the AD duty, the documented effects are somewhat different. The foreign firms 
can for example, by accident or through collusive behavior, raise prices too much and 
as a result increase the welfare loss (Lasagni 2000 p.150-151).   
3.3 Additional Effects 
One possible effect that was studied by Haaland and Wooton in 1998 is the relocating 
effect, also known as tariff jumping. Relocation through FDI becomes an option for 
firms in subject countries as they try to overcome the obstacle that is the AD measure. 
If proven successful this practice will hurt the domestic firms in the AD-imposing 
country (Haaland and Wooton 1998 p.341, 359). The consumers, on the other hand, 
will benefit since more efficient producers will operate in the domestic market. 
Another effect associated with both trade destruction and diversion is the so called 
investigation effect. This effect represents the threat-component that occurs as a result 
of the initiation of an AD case. That is, the initiation itself has a restricting effect on 
subject imports even if duties are not yet put in place (Staiger and Wolak 1994 p.60). 
One reason for this adjustment is that the initiation works as a signal to importers to 
redirect their imports away from targeted foreign suppliers so that they are not taken 
by surprise when the duties are imposed (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001 p.330). Staiger 
and Wolak (1994 p.101) found strong support for the existence of the investigation 
effect. The threat-component can also give grounds for horizontal cooperation 
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between domestic and foreign firms. Targeted foreign firms often agree to raise prices 
or restrict exports in order to avoid AD measures. In doing so, they capture some of the 
rents that would otherwise go to the AD-imposing government. This behavior is 
detrimental to the domestic consumers as it keeps prices up (Hoekman and Kostecki 
2001 p.325).   
It is worth mentioning that the use of AD also comes with a large number of costs, 
both in terms of time and resources. The largest one is the higher price that consumers 
are forced to pay, but AD measures also come with large administrative costs. Firm 
employees in the subject country cost millions of dollars as they are tied up defending 
the accused firm (Kerr 2006 p.25). Likewise, firms in the AD-imposing country will 
dedicate time and resources to influence their authorities. This rent-seeking behavior 
is harmful to the economy. Furthermore, the authorities in the AD-imposing country 
have to hire people to conduct the investigations.  
Gallaway et al (1998) used a general equilibrium model to estimate the total cost of AD 
and countervailing duties (duties designed to neutralize the effects of foreign 
subsidies) in the USA. The effect on welfare was found to be around 4 billion US 
dollars annually (Tharakan 1999 p.186-187).    
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4. Antidumping in the Steel Industry  
4.1 Industry Characteristics  
The steel industry has always been viewed as an important industry both in terms of 
jobs and national security. In addition, it possesses certain characteristics, which in the 
past have proven to be a decisive factor in receiving protection. For example, the 
industry is relatively concentrated and well-organized with few domestic firms, making 
it easier to present a united front and thereby exert pressure on the authorities. 
Making products out of iron or steel require substantial amounts of raw materials and 
electricity, not to mention the enormous fixed costs associated with establishing 
production facilities. In order to cover all these costs, steel makers need to produce a 
considerable amount of steel products. This tends to encourage overproduction that in 
turn leads to shrinking profit margins. In addition, the production process itself is 
characterized by inelastic supply. For example, steel mills have to buy and import raw 
materials using contracts that span over long periods of time. Moreover, mills use 
furnaces and other machinery that are slow to start up after a shut down. Thus, the 
process as a whole is considered inelastic in the short run. A consequence of this is that 
when demand plummets, mills incur losses and subsequently demand more protection 
(Ikenson 2004 p.3). 
The high fixed costs and inelastic production is a hotbed for an imperfectly 
competitive market with steel makers enjoying substantial economies of scale and 
potential competition facing high entry costs. Furthermore, the industry lobby 
organizations devote time and money to protect the industry from both domestic and 
foreign competition. Between 1998 and 2009, the steel producing industry in USA 
spent nearly 100 million U.S. dollars on lobbying alone (http://www.opensecrets.org).       
4.2 Protection in the Past 
The U.S. steel industry was during the first half of the 20th century a dominant exporter 
on the world market. The primary concern of the U.S. steel firms was to minimize the 
amount of domestic anti-trust charges. However, as producers in other countries 
became more efficient and as the dollar grew stronger so did the need for protection to 
the U.S. industry. In the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. government tried to restrict steel 
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imports through negotiated Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) and through price 
floors called Trigger Price Mechanisms (TPM). In between these periods of VERs and 
TPMs, the industry sought protection from AD and CVD (countervailing duties) 
actions. Thus, as the George H Bush administration in the early 1990s declined to 
impose new VERs, the AD and CVD cases surged and in 1992 reached a peak of 94 
cases (figure 4.1). After the surge, the industry went through a process of 
modernization, consequently gaining competitive power. In combination with the 
stronger economic situation, this helped to decrease the number of filed AD measures 
in the period between 1995 and 1997 (Blonigen et al. 2007 p.6-8).   
The so called “steel crisis”, which emerged in 1998 in the form of a currency crisis in 
Asia, suddenly put competitive pressure on to the U.S. producers. The crippled U.S. 
industry sought refuge behind new AD and CVD measures, while the government 
contributed with protection in the form of safeguard actions (Blonigen et al. 2007 p.8). 
The fluctuations in the number of AD cases filed during the 1990s and onwards can be 
seen in figure 4.1. The figure depicts all AD cases, against all countries, filed by the steel 
and iron industry (HTS product groups: 72 and 73) in relation to the total number of 
AD cases filed by all other sectors. The steel industry accounts for 358 cases which 
correspond to about 48 percent of all the 741 cases reported in the period. This may 
seem remarkably high, however the steel industry is here defined as all the firms that 
filed AD cases containing the product groups 72 and 73. These groups represent 
everything from pig iron to circular welded steel pipes. Blonigen et al. (2007 p.1) used a 
narrower definition of the steel industry and as a result found that the industry 
accounted for one-third of all cases (AD and CVD) reported from 1980 and onwards. 
Either way, the industry has in the past been a strong AD user in comparison to other 
industries.     
The ADA introduced within the Uruguay round in 1994 offered some disciplinary rules 
concerning the use of AD. For example, the sunset clause and the two percent 
dumping margin requirement was added. However, the definition of dumping 
remained the same and the practices used for obtaining dumping and injury margins 
were still difficult to regulate (Hoekman, Kostecki 2001 p.326-330). As a consequence, 
the number of cases initiated was relatively unaffected in the long run. In fact, the 
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number of cases initiated surged during the years after the completion of the round 
(Figure 4.1).    
Figure 4.1 Total Number of U.S. AD Cases against All Countries 1990 - 2009 
 
Source: Global Antidumping database: 
http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/ad/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Number of cases
Steel (HTS:72,73) All sectors(excl:steel,iron)
20 
 
5. U.S. Antidumping - Case Studies  
In this section I present three AD cases. Two of these cases, USITC 943-947 from 2001 
and USITC 1116 from 2007, contain the same product groups, namely HTS: 730630 – 
10/50. These groups are defined as: circular-welded non-alloy steel pipes (DOC: 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov). Although these eight-digit groups contain somewhat different 
sub-products depending on which case that is analyzed, it is still motivated to analyze 
them collectively. For one, the difference in characteristics between the subgroups is 
not great. Also, observed effects do not differ between the different ten-digit 
subgroups. The remaining case, USITC 1024-1028, is from 2003 and targets steel wire 
strands (HTS: 73121030-10/12).  
The specific cases have been selected in order to cover as many angles as possible of 
the complex AD instrument. Selected cases therefore vary in: outcomes of preliminary 
and final decisions, imposition of final duties, size of duties and number of subject 
countries. As you will see below, the difference between the 2001 case and the two 
other ones when it comes to final decisions, play a major role when studying the long-
term effects. Another reason for choosing these particular cases is that they simply 
enabled a price analysis. Numerous other cases investigated during the research-phase 
of this thesis showed too strong effects on imported quantities, i.e. the quantities 
plummeted down to zero. Since the price effect is measured by dividing the value with 
the imported quantity, this made it impossible to study the potential price effects.   
5.1 Case 1: USITC 943-947 - Circular-welded Non-alloy Steel Pipe (2001) 
5.1.1 Initiation and Investigations 
The case was initiated by the DOC on June 21, 2001 on the basis of a petition sent in by 
a number of U.S. steel pipe producers on 24 May, 2001. The original subject countries 
were: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Romania and South Africa. The two product groups 
in question were HTS-number 73063010 and 73063050. These two eight-digit groups, in 
turn, contained 19 ten-digit products (ITC Dataweb: http://dataweb.usitc.gov). By 
accounting for 79 percent of the domestic industry, the petitioners met the 
requirement of sufficient industry support (DOC: http://ia.ita.doc.gov).  
21 
 
Out of the five subject countries, China and Romania were considered NMEs. 
Dumping margins in the market economy countries were determined through simple 
price-to-price comparisons, only estimating minor costs. NME margins were calculated 
using surrogate country price data. The petitioners suggested that India was a suitable 
surrogate for China and that Egypt and Jordan were suitable for Romania. According to 
the petitioners these surrogates were suitable because they were: “i) market 
economies; ii) significant producers of the comparable merchandise; iii) at the 
comparable level of the subject countries in terms of per capita GNP” (DOC: 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov). The DOC concurred that these were the correct surrogates. 
Consequently, Chinese material values were based on Indian import values. Chinese 
electricity costs were estimated using OECD price data from the second quarter in 
2000, while natural gas costs were estimated using Indonesian price data. Water and 
freight costs were estimated in a similar fashion, using data from India and other Asian 
countries. Furthermore, Chinese profits were derived from five Indian steel producers. 
Romanian costs and profits were calculated in a similar way using data from Egypt and 
Jordan (DOC: http://ia.ita.doc.gov). 
The preliminary investigations concluded that Chinese firms had dumped products on 
the U.S. market by a margin of 36.42 percent, a margin that also served as the 
provisional AD duty. Additionally, the ITC found material injury as a result of the 
Chinese exports by analyzing import shares on the like products. However, the other 
subject countries were found not to be the cause of injury and therefore these 
countries escaped further investigations (ITC: http://www.usitc.gov).  
5.1.2 Final Measure 
The preliminary decision was in place for about five months, until the final injury 
investigation showed that injury in fact had not occurred as a result of Chinese exports 
(ITC: http://www.usitc.gov). Although the U.S. industry’s profitability was declining 
between 1999 and 2001, the ITC concluded that this was caused by weakening demand 
and increasing non-subject imports, rather than increasing subject imports (ITC: 
http://www.usitc.gov). Thus, no final duties were imposed and the collected 
preliminary duties were paid back. The entire case history can be viewed in table 5.1 
below. 
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Table 5.1 Case 1: USITC 943-947 – Case History 
DOC Case 
Number Country Product Group Initiation Preliminary Final AD Duty 
A-570-870 China 730630-10/50 Jun 21, 2001 Dec 31, 2001 
36.42 % 
Jul 09, 2002 
Neg. Injury  
- 
A-560-814 Indonesia 730630-10/50 Jun 21, 2001 Neg. Injury - - 
A-557-811 Malaysia 730630-10/50 Jun 21, 2001 Neg. Injury - - 
A-485-807 Romania 730630-10/50 Jun 21, 2001 Neg. Injury - - 
A-791-812 South Africa 730630-10/50 Jun 21, 2001 Neg. Injury - - 
Source: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html 
5.2 Case 2: USITC 1116 – Circular-welded Non-alloy Steel Pipe (2007) 
Although product groups remained the same, i.e. 73063010 and 73063050, the final 
outcomes and duties differed from the case initiated in 2001. Further, as China was the 
only subject country to reach past preliminary investigations in both 2001 and 2007, 
the two cases enable a collective analysis of the effects. This is an interesting analytical 
advantage.   
5.2.1 Initiation and Investigations 
The petition, filed by seven American steel producers on June 7 2007, led to the 
initiation of the case on July 5 2007. The producers accounted for more than 25 percent 
of the total domestic production of the like product and consequently met the 
regulatory requirements. The single subject country was China. As in the 2001 case, 
China kept its status as an NME, but this time the DOC decided to use India, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Egypt as surrogate countries in the 
investigation. The rationale behind this decision was the same as in the 2001 
investigation, i.e. subject countries were considered to be: “i) market economies; ii) 
significant producers of the comparable merchandise; iii) at the comparable level of 
the subject countries in terms of per capita GNP” (DOC: http://ia.ita.doc.gov). 
Dumping margins were again calculated using different kinds of surrogate data, 
including for example electricity and profit data. Thus, the methodology of calculating 
margins did not change from the case initiated in 2001. 
The preliminary decision showed that both dumping and injury had occurred during 
the period of investigation (October 2006 to March 2007). Associated provisional 
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duties of 25.67 percent (firm-specific rate) and 51.34 percent (country-wide rate) were 
put in place in January 2008 (DOC: http://ia.ita.doc.gov).  
5.2.2 Final Measure 
In contrast to the USITC 943-947 investigation, this investigation reached an 
affirmative final decision both in terms of dumping and in terms of injury. 
Additionally, the final duties were, after further investigation, raised to 69.20 and 85.55 
percent respectively. The country-wide rate of 85.55 percent applied to all Chinese 
firms not investigated by the DOC and ITC.     
Table 5.2 Case 2: USITC 1116 – Case History 
Case Number Country Product Initiation Preliminary Final AD Duty 
A-570-910 China 730630-10/50 Jul 05, 2007 Jan 15, 2008  
25.67 - 51.34 % 
Jun 05, 
2008 
Jul 22, 2008  
69,2 - 85,55 %  
Source: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html 
 
5.3 Case 3: USITC 1024-1028 – Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand (2003) 
5.3.1 Initiation and Investigations 
This case was initiated on February 27 2003. The ten-digit products named in the 
initiation were limited to two: 7312103010 and 7312103012. These products were defined 
as “…covered and uncovered strand and all types, grades, and diameters of PC strand.” 
(ITC: http://www.usitc.gov). None of the five subject countries Brazil, India, South 
Korea, Mexico and Thailand were considered NMEs. As a result, the preliminary and 
final investigations used other methods to establish the normal value. One of these 
methods was the “facts available” method, which is used whenever foreign firms supply 
incorrect information or simply do not bother to respond to the DOC’s requests. This 
was the case for all subject countries except Thailand. The DOC argued that the firms 
in the other countries had failed to comply with the DOCs request for information and 
that they had obstructed the investigations. The reliability of the dumping margins 
stated in the domestic firms’ petitions were therefore assessed and subsequently used 
as substitutes for the missing information. Preliminary dumping margins were 
imposed on July 17 2003 following the affirmative injury decision from the ITC on 
March 17 2003. ITCs decision was determined by investigating the volume of subject 
24 
 
imports and their effect on prices for the domestic like product, as well as the impact 
on domestic producers (ITC: http://www.usitc.gov).  
 
5.3.2 Final Measure 
The final decisions did not deviate from the preliminary decisions. Thailand received 
the lowest duty of 12.91 percent, while the other countries received higher duties as a 
result of the facts available method. The final duties were imposed on January 28 2004 
(Table 5.3).      
  
Table 5.3 Case 3: USITC 1024-1028 – Case History 
DOC Case 
Number Country Product Initiation Preliminary Final AD Duty 
A-351-837 Brazil 73121030-
10/12 
Feb 27, 2003 Jul 17, 2003 
118.75% 
Dec 08, 2003 Jan 28, 2004  
118.75 % 
A-533-828 India 73121030-
10/12 
Feb 27, 2003 Jul 17, 2003     
83.65 - 102.07 % 
Dec 08, 2003 Jan 28, 2004  
83.65 - 102.07% 
A-580-852 South 
Korea 
73121030-
10/12 
Feb 27, 2003 Jul 17, 2003  
35.64 - 54.19 % 
Dec 08, 2003 Jan 28, 2004  
35.64 - 54.19 % 
A-201-831 Mexico 73121030-
10/12 
Feb 27, 2003 Jul 17, 2003  
57.64 - 77.20 % 
Dec 08, 2003 Jan 28, 2004  
57.64 - 77.20 % 
A-549-820 Thailand 73121030-
10/12 
Feb 27, 2003 Jul 17, 2003  
11.52 % 
Dec 08, 2003 Jan 28, 2004  
12.91 % 
Source: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html 
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6. Trade Effects of Antidumping Cases 
The goal of this analysis is to study the potential presence of trade destruction and 
trade diversion, as well as the potential price effects stated earlier. Quantity effects are 
studied in depth by measuring variations in quarterly import flows from subject 
countries and non-subject countries over a particular time period, in this case 1996 – 
2009. The selection of this time period eliminates potentially misleading results caused 
by the change in AD regulation in 1994 (Uruguay Round). Finally, figures showing 
import values in dollars are only displayed in the appendix. The reason for this is that 
these values do not contribute to the analysis, since they are highly correlated with the 
imported quantities.    
The complete set of quarterly import data has been collected from ITC’s database 
Dataweb (http://dataweb.usitc.gov). To isolate the effects of the AD measures on 
imports, it is important to remain on the same “data level” and to separate AD-affected 
imports (subject countries) from unaffected imports (non-subject countries). In an 
effort to reach accurate results, this analysis therefore measures imports on precisely 
the same HTS-digit product level as stated in the AD measures. Further, import 
quantities from subject and non-subject countries, together with subjects’ share of 
total imports, are displayed in the same figure. This way, effects on imported quantities 
are clearly visible and easy to compare. The inclusion of subject countries’ share of 
total imports in the analysis serves the purpose of showing the degree of subject 
penetration on the U.S. market. A large share of U.S. imports from a particular 
country, i.e. high level of penetration, is expected to increase the probability of that 
country being targeted in an AD measure. After all, material injury is likely to be 
greater if the subject countries’ shares of the U.S. market are large. Moreover, as larger 
quantities move from subject to non-subject imports, large import shares are likely to 
result in clearer trade divertive effects.  
It would of course be fruitful to measure how the U.S. industry production is affected 
by the imposition of the AD measures. One could then measure the potential benefits 
associated with the AD measures from a domestic industry perspective. However, since 
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the product levels are very specific in the AD measures, this is made virtually 
impossible. There is simply no such data available on U.S. domestic production.   
For simplicity, figures in the upcoming analysis include data labels that denote points 
of interest in each AD case. The purpose of this is to mark out the different decisions 
throughout the timeline of the investigations and thereby clearly illustrate the effects 
on imported quantities and prices. The labels correspond to the following points of 
interest: 
A: Initiation of the case. 
B: Preliminary decision. 
C: Final decision. 
D: Final imposition of AD duty.  
Since the final decision for case 1 (USITC 943-947) in 2002 was negative, the label (D) 
is not represented during that period of investigation in figure 6.1.1 below. The label is, 
however, represented in the 2007 case (USITC 1116), displayed in that same figure. 
6.1 Case 1 and 2: USITC 943-947 and 1116 - Circular-welded Non-alloy Steel Pipe  
China was the only subject country to reach past the preliminary stage in the 2001 case. 
Hence, China was also the only country subjected to provisional duties (36.42 percent). 
The potential effects on imports from the other subject countries are therefore likely to 
be small. It is possible that “investigation effects”, i.e. decreasing imports as a result of 
the initiation, could be present in the data. However, when analyzing all countries 
collectively, the changes in imports from the other subject countries are likely to cause 
misleading results. Thus, China is the only subject country used in the analysis of 
USITC cases: 943-947 and 1116. 
The observed trade effects (A - D) of case 1 and 2 are ultimately summarized in section 
6.1.3.  
6.1.1 Quantity Effects 
AD measures usually have the purpose of restricting imported quantities from the 
subject countries. The expected quantity effects of AD measures are therefore, 
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decreasing imports from subject countries (trade destruction) and increasing imports 
from non-subject countries (trade diversion). Figure 6.1.1 shows quarterly data of 
imported quantities from both subject countries and non-subject countries. The axis 
on the left shows total imported quantities in metric tons. It corresponds to the subject 
and non-subject lines, while the axis on the right corresponds to the dotted red line 
(shares).  
Apart from the increase in imported quantities and import shares in 1997, possibly 
caused by AD and CVD duties targeting other countries, subject quantities averaged 
below 20 000 tons quarterly throughout the nineties. The subject import share 
remained at the level of ten percent. One year before the 2001 initiation the subject 
quantity increased to a steady flow of about 50 000 tons quarterly, pushing the subject 
share up to around 15 percent. The initiation of the first case took place during the very 
last days of Q2 2001, marked with (A) in the figure. Since imports were measured over 
the whole quarter, it is therefore likely to assume that the effects of the initiation were 
delayed one quarter. Consequently, it would be more accurate to assign the initiation 
to the third quarter. This makes sense when examining the figure, because subject 
quantities fell sharply from 43 000 tons in Q3 to 6 000 tons in Q4. Likewise, the subject 
share of total imports fell from 16 percent in Q3 to 3 percent in Q4. The decrease in 
subject quantity imports gained momentum and throughout the first three quarters of 
2002 quantities stayed below 2 000 tons and subject shares stayed around zero. This is 
not surprising as the period Q4 2001 – Q3 2002, marked the period during which the 
preliminary duty of 36.42 percent was in force. Thus, the lowest numbers of imported 
subject quantities were reported during the period of the preliminary duty (B-C). After 
this period, from Q3 2002 (C) and onwards, the subject quantities and shares rose 
steadily.    
In contrast to the subject imports, the non-subject imports had a flat trend of around 
200 000 tons throughout the entire sample period. However, variations seem to have 
been present all over the period. At the time of the initiation of the 2001 case (A), the 
non-subject quantity was at around 225 000 tons. Keep in mind that (A) should be 
closer to (B), since the initiation took place in the very last days of Q2 2001. When the 
preliminary duty was put in place in Q4 2001, non-subject quarterly imports climbed 
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approximately 63 000 tons, an increase of about 28 percent. The increase, in absolute 
terms, of non-subject imports was therefore greater than the decrease in subject 
imports, suggesting that the AD measure did not cause the entire spike in non-subject 
imports. However, it is reasonable to assume that some of the subject imports were 
replaced by non-subject imports. This suggests that there was some sort of trade 
divertive effect as a result of the 2001 AD case.  
Figure 6.1.1 Case 1 and 2: Imports and Shares of Total Imports HTS: 730630-10/50
Source: ITC Dataweb: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
Note: A: Initiation of the case, B: Preliminary decision, C: Final decision, D: Final imposition of AD duty. 
 
After the negative final injury decision, imports from China, the only subject country, 
increased at a high rate. During the five year period Q3 2002 to Q3 2007, imports from 
the subject country increased from 1 600 tons to 215 000 tons and subject shares rose 
from one to 61 percent (figure 6.1.1). With a share of 61 percent, China was at the time 
of the USITC 1116-initiation the largest exporter of circular-welded non-alloy steel pipes 
to the U.S. However, the initiation of the case had dramatic effects on imported 
quantities from both subject and non-subject countries. Between the initiation (A) and 
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the preliminary duty (B), the subject share of total imports plummeted from 61 percent 
to two percent and quantities dropped from 215 000 tons to 5 000 tons. This is quite a 
remarkable result, considering that the period spanned only over two quarters. From 
the imposition of the preliminary duties (B) and through to the imposition of the final 
duties (D), subject quantities and shares remained at an exceptionally low level. In 
contrast to the 2001 case, the 2007 case appears to have had a prolonged destructive 
effect on imported quantities from the subject country. This effect is likely the result of 
the final duties (69.20 – 85.55 percent) that were imposed on China in the third quarter 
of 2008, in combination with the imminent recession developing during that period. 
Between the initiation (A) and the final duty (D) imported quantities from non-subject 
countries, i.e. all countries except China, increased by 85 percent. As in the 2001 case, 
this increase seems to have been connected to the fall in subject quantities and shares, 
which suggests that trade diversion was present from Q3 2007 to Q3 2008. Subject 
quantities and shares remained low throughout the rest of the sample period. 
However, the non-subject quantity appears to have dropped significantly after the 
imposition of the final duty (D). A possible explanation for this could be the imminent 
recession. It is likely that the recession caused decreasing imports from all countries. 
This becomes evident when looking at the value of total U.S. imports (all products) 
from all countries. The values were growing steadily until late 2008 (U.S. Census 
Bureau). This suggests that the recession caused an industry-wide drop in imports and 
consequently also a drop in imports on the relevant steel products.  
6.1.2 Price Effects  
Since the goal of the AD instrument is to restrict imports and raise prices, the 
anticipated price effects are increased prices at the border on named products from 
subject countries. Price effects are measured by taking the “customs value”, i.e. the 
total value in dollars of the good entering USA, divided by the “first unit of quantity”. 
In doing so, the price effects are separated from the quantity effects, making them 
easier to analyze. Price effects on the imported products 73063010 and 73063050 are 
presented in figure 6.1.2.  
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Throughout the whole sample period, i.e. Q1 1996 to Q3 2009, the subject price ratio 
stayed below the non-subject price, except during two short periods coinciding with 
the two AD cases. During the nineties, both subject and non-subject price ratios 
experienced modest variations. This changed in the third quarter of 2001, when the 
subject price started to increase, probably to some extent as a result of the USITC 943-
947 case initiated just one quarter earlier. The preliminary duty was put in place in Q4 
2001 (B) and subsequently subject prices started to rise sharply. This price increase 
peaked in the second quarter of 2002 and after that it started to decrease again. After 
the final negative injury decision (C), the subject price ratio went down to the level 
observed before the AD measure was put in place. Thus, as expected, the pattern seems 
to have been negatively correlated with the subject quantity imported. This pattern 
was repeated throughout the period of the USITC 1116 case. Initiated in Q3 2007 (A), 
the case appears to have raised the price ratio sharply all the way up to the quarter 
following the imposition of the final AD duty of 69.20 – 85.55 percent in the third 
quarter of 2008. Like in the case of the imported quantity it is reasonable to assume 
that, from late 2008 and onwards, prices were affected by the diminishing demand 
caused by the recession.     
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Figure 6.1.2 Case 1 and 2: Subject (CHN) and Non-subject Price Ratios (Customs 
Value/First Unit of Quantity) HTS: 730630-10/50 
Source: ITC Dataweb: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
Note: A: Initiation of the case, B: Preliminary decision, C: Final decision, D: Final imposition of AD duty. 
 
6.1.3 Effects Sum-up 
Effects of AD-cases USITC 943-947 and 1116, are here summarized according to the 
points of interest marked with letters: A-D. 
A: Both cases showed clear evidence of trade destruction, i.e. decreasing quantities 
imported from the subject country as a result of the initiation. In fact the destruction 
appears to have been substantial as early as during the period in-between the initiation 
and the preliminary decision, which further strengthens the evidence of the so called 
investigation effect. Trade divertive effects also seem to be present during the 
initiation period, although it is difficult to estimate how much of the increases in non-
subject imports that were caused by diversion. Increases in prices were also visible 
during the period of initiation, especially in the case initiated in 2007.   
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B: In both cases the affirmative preliminary decisions stimulated the destructive and 
divertive effects. That is, the decisions formally strengthened the already active 
investigations and consequently also the effects of the decisions. This period coupled 
with the initiation period (A) showed the largest effects on quantities, shares and 
prices.    
C-D: One interesting observation can be made in relation to the final decisions of the 
two cases, namely the effect of the final negative decision in the 2001 case in 
comparison to the effect of the final affirmative decision in the 2007 case. After the 
negative final decision (C) in 2002 the subject quantities started to rise quickly. 
Conversely, the affirmative final decision in 2008 continued to restrict imports from 
subject countries throughout the subsequent period. This suggests that the final 
decisions were decisive factors for the development of long-term future subject 
imports. The price did also continue to increase during this period of the case initiated 
in 2007.           
6.2 Case 3: USITC 1024-1028 – Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand 
In contrast to the cases concerning circular-welded steel pipes, this case targeted 
several countries with final duties. It is therefore reasonable to include all the original 
subject countries, when analyzing the effects of the measure. The observed trade 
effects of case 3 are ultimately summarized in section 6.2.3. 
6.2.1 Quantity Effects 
Although products, countries, duties, period of time etc have changed, I still expect to 
find trade destruction and trade diversion. Furthermore, the imposition of final duties 
on all subject countries should imply clearer long-term effects on subject and non-
subject imports, due to the five year sunset review. The quantity effects are displayed 
figure 6.2.1 and the points of interest are marked out using the same data labels as 
earlier. 
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Figure 6.2.1 Case 3: Imports and Shares of Total Imports HTS: 73121030-10/12 
Source: ITC Dataweb: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
Note: A: Initiation of the case, B: Preliminary decision, C: Final decision, D: Final imposition of AD duty. 
 
Throughout the nineties subject quarterly imports increased from 6 000 to 17 000 tons, 
while non-subject imports had a relatively flat trend at just below 10 000 tons. During 
the first years of the new century, subject shares increased to about 80 percent in Q1 
2003 and quantities peaked at 22 000 tons. Thus, subject countries’ penetration was 
very high at the time of the initiation (A). The initiation of USITC 1024-1028 in Q1 2003 
was followed by a fall in subject imports. During the two-quarter long period between 
the initiation and the preliminary decision (A to B), imported subject quantities fell 
from 22 000 tons to 4 000 tons. At the same time subject shares of total imports, fell 
from 79 percent to 18 percent. Two quarters later, at the time of the imposition of the 
final duties (D), the subject quantities were down at approximately 890 tons. Subject 
shares also continued to plummet from four percent at (D) to virtually zero in late 
2005. Throughout the rest of the sample period, with the exception of two quarters, 
imported subject quantities stayed below 1 000 tons. Thus, the trade destructive effects 
of the AD measure were large both in absolute and in relative terms. Substantial 
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subject shares were completely erased in just one year (A-D). The following final duties 
appear to have worked in a prohibitive way on subject imports throughout the rest of 
the sample period. There seems to have been a sustained long term effect on subject 
imports. 
From the initiation in Q1 2003 to the imposition of the final duties one year later, non-
subject imports increased over 300 percent from approximately 6 000 tons to about 
25 000 tons. During that same period subject imports fell from 22 000 tons to about 
900 tons. The subject fall therefore seems to have been replaced by an increase in non-
subject imports, which suggests that trade diversion was present as a result of the AD 
measure. After the final duties were put in place non-subject imports continued to 
increase, peaking in Q3 2006 with about 66 000 tons. The following period contained 
several large variations ending with a substantial fall in non-subject imports in late 
2008. Similar decreases in late 2008 were found in the other cases as well, implying 
that this fall had something to do with the recession. 
6.2.2 Price Effects 
The price effects of the USITC 1024-1028 case were not as clear cut as the effects 
observed in the two earlier cases. In fact, the subject and non-subject price ratios 
moved closely together from 1996 until the end of 2004, though both price ratios 
increased from early 2003 (A) and onwards (Figure 6.2.2). Between 2005 and 2009, 
non-subject prices had a u-shaped progress, whereas subject prices saw significant 
year-to-year variations. The overall subject price level was, however, higher than the 
non-subject price level during this period, which suggests that prices were affected by 
the low level of subject imports.   
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Figure 6.2.2 Case 3: Subject and Non-subject Price Ratios (Customs Value/First 
Unit of Quantity) HTS: 73121030-10/12 
Source: ITC Dataweb: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
Note: A: Initiation of the case, B: Preliminary decision, C: Final decision, D: Final imposition of AD duty. 
 
6.2.3 Effects Sum-up 
A: Like the cases presented earlier, this one showed clear evidence of trade destruction 
as a result of the initiation. In fact, as in the earlier cases, the largest drop in imported 
quantities from subject countries was present during the period in between the 
initiation and the preliminary decision (A-B). Again, this shows the importance of the 
investigation effect on short term imports. This finding also implies that the sizes of 
duties were relatively unimportant in the short run perspective, as the initiation itself 
had a very large effect on quantities imported from subject countries.  
Divertive effects were also present during the period after the initiation. However the 
investigation effect appears not to have been as large as when it comes to trade 
destruction. The subject price during the period of initiation increased slightly. 
B: As in the earlier cases, the preliminary decisions added to both the destructive and 
the divertive effects. Subject imports continued to decrease and non-subject imports 
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continued to increase with supported strength from the imposed provisional duties. 
Subject price ratios actually fell during this quarter, before embarking on the long term 
climb in Q4 2003. 
C-D: The final decisions and duties primarily affected imports from non-subject 
countries. Specifically, these imports increased sharply in the quarter after the final 
duties were imposed. Subject imports continued to fall during this period and 
remained at low level throughout the rest of the sample period, implying that the 
imposed final duties had a long-term restricting effect on subject imports and shares. 
Both subject and non-subject prices rose after the final decisions and duties. 
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7. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis I have analyzed the effects associated with AD measures filed by U.S. 
steel producers in three cases initiated in 2001, 2003 and 2007. The expected effects, i.e. 
decreasing subject imports, increasing non-subject imports and increasing prices, were 
to some degree all found in connection to the AD-cases. The cases showed strong 
destructive, as well as distinct divertive, effects on imports from subject and non-
subject countries as early as one to two quarters after the initiations (A). Such large 
effects were not expected to emerge during the period of initiation, since this period 
does not involve duties. This result suggests that the threat-component of the AD 
instrument is of greater importance than expected, which further strengthens the 
support for the so called investigation effect. The provisional (B) and final (D) duties 
merely added to the already initiated changes in imports. The final duties (D) had a 
long-term restricting effect on subject imports, whereas the increasing effects on non-
subject imports were concentrated to shorter periods of time regardless of the number 
of duties imposed.  
There were apparent differences between the 2001 case, which was given a negative 
final decision (C), and the two other cases. The 2001 case showed signs of destruction 
and diversion, but these effects, as expected, disappeared when the investigation was 
terminated due to the negative final injury decision (C). The other cases included final 
five-year-duties (D) and consequently the effects were visible over longer periods of 
time.      
Clear price effects were found in connection to the first two AD-cases initiated in 2001 
and 2007. In these cases, subject price ratios increased sharply one to two quarters 
after the initiations (A). The price effects in the case initiated in 2003 were rather 
ambiguous. Prices rose on subject imports after the initiation, however so did the 
prices on non-subject imports. It is therefore uncertain whether or not the increase 
was caused by the AD measures. On the other hand, subject prices remained relatively 
high at the end of 2005 suggesting that the low import volumes had some effect on 
prices. 
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In the light of these results one can argue that the AD measures were successful. At the 
same time one can ask what the general AD associated benefits are from a petitioner’s 
point of view. After all, the results suggest that there are divertive effects associated 
with the AD measures, which would imply that the overall import is unchanged after 
imposed AD measures and that the practice of filing petitions would thus be pointless. 
On the other hand, the observed investigation effect suggests that the filing of AD 
measures is in fact not a pointless practice. Rather, the filing behavior has an 
intimidating effect on foreign firms. In this sense AD measures work as informal price 
floors, informing foreign firms to stay within the price range of the domestic firms. 
Foreign firms that still lower their prices face the risk of being subjected to AD 
measures and subsequent exclusion from the U.S. market. This threat-component of 
the AD instrument gives the import competing domestic firms breathing space and 
some control over their domestic market. Foreign firms and domestic consumers, on 
the other hand, are likely to be worse off because of the increased prices and lower 
import volumes. This development is also driven by the domestic industries’ ability to 
influence their government as well as the international community’s inability to reform 
the AD regulations. 
The inability to reform the ADA and the national AD regulations is a cause for 
concern. Today, domestic authorities use methods to establish dumping and injury 
margins that are, to say the least, questionable in their accuracy. The flawed definition 
of dumping, together with practices like “facts available” and “NME” methods, make 
AD an attractive option for domestic firms because these practices tend to lead to 
affirmative decisions. Despite several efforts to reform the ADA, nothing has been 
done about these problems. The explanation is perhaps the powerful interests vested 
in the wellbeing of the domestic industries, in combination with the lack of political 
will in favor of reform. In any case, economists worldwide agree that, since AD is a 
potent trade restricting tool, reform is necessary for the good of global trade and 
competition.   
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Appendix 
Figure 1. USITC: 943-947 and 1116 - Imported Values HTS: 730630-10/50 
 
Source: ITC Dataweb: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/  
Figure 2. USITC: 1024-1028 – Imported Values HTS: 73121030-10/12 
 
Source: ITC Dataweb: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
-
50 000 000    
100 000 000    
150 000 000    
200 000 000    
250 000 000    
300 000 000    
350 000 000    
Q
1-
96
Q
3-
96
Q
1-
97
Q
3-
97
Q
1-
98
Q
3-
98
Q
1-
99
Q
3-
99
Q
1-
00
Q
3-
00
Q
1-
01
Q
3-
01
Q
1-
02
Q
3-
02
Q
1-
03
Q
3-
03
Q
1-
04
Q
3-
04
Q
1-
05
Q
3-
05
Q
1-
06
Q
3-
06
Q
1-
07
Q
3-
07
Q
1-
08
Q
3-
08
Q
1-
09
Q
3-
09
U.S. Dollars
Subject Value Non-subject Value
-
10 000 000    
20 000 000    
30 000 000    
40 000 000    
50 000 000    
60 000 000    
70 000 000    
Q
1-
96
Q
3-
96
Q
1-
97
Q
3-
97
Q
1-
98
Q
3-
98
Q
1-
99
Q
3-
99
Q
1-
00
Q
3-
00
Q
1-
01
Q
3-
01
Q
1-
02
Q
3-
02
Q
1-
03
Q
3-
03
Q
1-
04
Q
3-
04
Q
1-
05
Q
3-
05
Q
1-
06
Q
3-
06
Q
1-
07
Q
3-
07
Q
1-
08
Q
3-
08
Q
1-
09
Q
3-
09
U.S Dollars
Subject Value Non-subject Value
